Flag of Georgia
What’s the matter with Russia and Georgia? The latest increase in tensions, and I’m not talking about the shooting down of unmanned spy-planes, does not appear to be a cyclical high, but a systematic trend toward escalation. Ever since NATO’s failure in Bucharest to extend a Membership Action Plan to Georgia (also Macedonia and Ukraine), Moscow has stepped up its military actions against Tbilisi.
At first, it denied involvement by, for example, claiming that it was Abkhazia’s air force rather than RFAF that kept shooting down Georgia’s aircraft. Now it openly admits being involved.
Why is Russia behaving this way? Here is Georgia’s president Mikheil Saakashvili speaking in Yalta, Ukraine:
Georgia is a test case,” adding, “Today, Georgia. Tomorrow, Ukraine and then other countries in the region that they [the Russians] see as falling within their sphere of influence. They will be looking carefully at the Western reaction and will act accordingly.
Russia’s reply: it was angered by Georgia’s hopes to join NATO and the European Union and said it acted to defend the breakaway regions from Georgian aggression.
What aggression is not clear. Presumably, Georgia’s flying unmanned aircraft over its sovereign territory was interpreted by Russia as “aggression.” More unsettling for Moscow however is Tbilisi’s application to join NATO.
In that case, what does Russia want?Alexander Rondeli, at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), has the following take on it in an article for openDemocracy.
Russia wants Georgia to remain within its political, military and economical orbit. But what can Russia offer: democracy, prosperity, security, protection? Russia wants to keep Georgia for itself but Georgia wants to escape from the claws of the former “big brother”. Georgia is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society and it has to become a genuine democracy in order for it to survive as a viable nation-state. Thus it is a strategic imperative that impels its core national goal - to join the European and Euro-Atlantic structures; rather than (as it is often assumed to be) Russophobia.
Rondeli then goes on to note another reality of European diplomacy - the tepid diplomatic involvement of Europe as a mediating party between Moscow and Tbilisi.
At the same time, western well-wishers routinely turn a blind eye to this unequal confrontation, with the smell of oil and gas prevailing over feelings of sympathy and understanding.
Here is why Europe needs to be involved, according to the Financial Times (FT):
Georgia matters to the west because it is the current standard-bearer of the democratic revolt against Moscow that began in central Europe in 1989. While the flags of freedom flying in Tbilisi are stained by Mr Saakashvili’s authoritarian lapses, Georgia’s leaders still generally embrace democratic values. Also, Georgia straddles the only non-Russian route taking Caspian oil and gas to world markets. Lose Georgia, and Russia wins an even bigger say over energy supplies. The risks were highlighted by this week’s cut, for technical reasons, in Russian oil flows to the Czech Republic after Prague agreed to host part of the US missile shield.
Certainly, the west should try to engage Russia in talks over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as long as they are based on preserving Georgian sovereignty. It should also redouble efforts to restrain hotheads in Tbilisi from resorting to violence. But when Russia bullies Georgia. the west must back its vulnerable ally.
Do you think Rondeli is right or wrong? What about the FT? Voice your opinion in the comments.
The problems with all those arguments is the assertion that Georgia is a flourishing democracy. That is a fiction perpetuated by groups and governments that support America’s increased foothold in the area and a general weakening of Russia’s influence. The situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, just like in Kosovo have become less about the territories’ individual situations and more about the agendas of the major players involved. Basically, Georgia is ground zero in the battle for geo-political positioning between Russia and NATO. Democracy and the old “Russian sphere of influence” have little to do with it. It comes down to the fact that the Saakashvili government was brought about by huge Western support, because a pro-Western government and NATO membership means NATO bases and extended economic, political and military influence on our part in the region. Obviously Russia doesn’t want any more NATO bases on her border. How would we feel about Russia supporting governmental overturns in Canada and Mexico, then lining our border with military bases. Here’s an assessment I feel is more accurate by F. William Engdahl.
The Caucasus Republic of Georgia, as nations go, is not apparently a major global player. Yet Washington has invested huge sums and organized to put its own despot, Mikhail Saakashvili, in the presidency in order to close a nuclear North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) iron ring around Russia.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited the capital Tbilisi and made sharp statements against Moscow for supporting the separatist Georgian states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in essence blaming Moscow for an imminent war Washington has incited in order to bring Georgia into NATO by the December NATO summit.
Western media have either tended to ignore the growing tensions in the strategic Caucasus region or to suggest, as Rice does, that the entire conflict is being caused by Moscow’s support of the “breakaway” republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In reality, a quite different chess game is being played in the region, one which has the potential to detonate a major escalation of tensions between Moscow and NATO.
By the way, any response to this point of view would be appreciated at my site:
http://3kingsmiddlegame.wordpress.com/
Note however that neither Rondeli nor the FT aver that Georgia is a “flourishing democracy” or for that matter that it is a democracy.
The closest Rondeli comes to this is when he says: “It has to become a genuine democracy in order for it to survive as a viable nation-state” - he does not say Georgia is a true democracy, but one that it ought to become.
Similarly the FT, first acknowledges Saakashvili’s authoritarian lapses before noting: “Georgia’s leaders still generally embrace democratic values” - hardly a claim of a “flourishing democracy.”
I also disagree with Engdahl. For one, Washington did not somehow orchestrate Saakashvili’s rise to power. That may be true of other historical occasions, such as the installation of Shah in Iran, but not in Georgia.
Second, contrary to Engdahl’s unsupported claim, Saakashvili is not a despot, as he does not have absolute power. This is confirmed by the Freedom House (founded by Eleanor Roosevelt) ranking of Georgia as “partly free” rather than “not free.”
Finally, Washington did not incite any war in the region. It criticized Russia for actions which Moscow has by now admitted to be responsible for - violating Georgia’s sovereignty, and shooting down its reconnaissance planes.
Neither I nor Engdahl intended to make the point that Washington was somehow responsible for the tensions in Moscow. However, both he and myself feel that America is not currently being a helpful influence in the conflict. We are currently treating Georgia similarly as Israel–a potential beacon of influence in the region that we can maintain, albeit by attracting more enemies at a greater geo-political cost than it’s worth.
In terms of whether or not Saakashvili is a despot, well, when it comes to evaluating freedom and democracy, its always a semantics game. My point would simply be that at best Saakashvili’s government is as democratic as the Putin/Medvedev regime in Russia. So whatever you call that, “partly free,” “not free,” “de facto dictatorship,” whatever. One way or the other, the idea that our involvement in the situation has to do with defending a democracy from an autocratic state is a farce. We are defending our national interests; Russia is defending theirs, and given that Georgia is on its border, has more inherent justification for doing so.
I think Nicolas Clayton analyses are affected by the fact that he is “defending his interests”. Because of that his analyses have nothing to do with reality. The comparison of Saakashvili and Medvedev governments (not regimes) is unadecuat. But if Clayton wants to defend his opinion it is easier to compar Saakashvili with Medvedev. In such a case both will be bad and the realpolitic (Better to colaborate with stronger than weaker) will be more acceptable for democratic values.
Saakashvili’s rise to power was affected by the Shevardnadzes politic (inside the country) and by the politic of Russia (From autside). Both, Shevardnadze and Russia roused the feeling of inobservance by georgian community.
Saakashvilis government is one step of countries development. Under the next government the democratic situation in Georgia will be better and not because the next president will be better or worse, but because the community will have more experience.
What about Russia? Putin/Medvedev Government isn’t a regime, because it is the normal for Russia; since very long time approved ruling method in this country and the people of Russia doesn’t want to change it.