The 8th Circle

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I invite you to read a scathing, yet polite and cogent critique of John McCain’s statement on Georgia and NATO by Gregory Djerejian in The Belgravia Dispatch (via WPR blog post by Hampton Stephens).

I don’t agree with everything in the Belgravia post, but it is very well-written and sums up the position of the anti-NATO enlargement camp.

Both Djerejian and Stephens seem to hold the view that NATO enlargement is inherently bad.  In this Djerejian relies on George F. Kennan, a venerable figure in the pantheon of American foreign policy leaders.  In a 1997 op-ed for the New York Times, Kennan warned against a decision by the Clinton administration to back NATO enlargement, writing that:

“expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold war era.”

Why?  Because, as Kennan put it, by bringing NATO closer to Russia’s borders, we would:

…inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking…

Under this school of thought (classical realism?), our decision making should be based on asking the question:  How will our actions affect the relations of major powers?  Thus for example, if Russia is negatively predisposed toward NATO enlargement, the U.S. should adopt that position instead of those emanating from secondary states (i.e. non-major powers), like:

• the 1999 NATO co-hort of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and
• the 2004 NATO co-hort of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Instead of helping these countries anchor their democracies in a post-Cold War environment, this school of thought would rather have us not “compound the blunder.”  Maybe what Djerejian and Stephens have in mind is the division of Europe that took place at Yalta, when rather than taking into consideration the interests of the secondary states, Roosevelt apparently did the right thing by letting Stalin take over Eastern Europe for the next half a century?

Maybe they don’t, but I’m unclear as to what exactly should have been NATO’s policy in the aftermath of the Cold War?  Was it really a mistake to admit the Visegrad group, the Baltics and the rest of southeastern Europe?

And was Kennan right when he wrote that such NATO enlargement would inhibit the development of democracy in Russia and fan nationalism?

Did not the two wars in Chechnya, the consequent terrorism, and petro-dollars contribute more to Russia’s move toward authoritarianism than NATO’s enlargement?  Could it be that when history books are sanitized to reflect a version approved by the Kremlin, this too has much to do with increased Russian nationalism?  When mass media, although ostentibly “private,” nevertheless reflects a carefully deleniated line approved by the authorities or simply engages in self-censorship, thereby stifling any alternative views on the events within and without the country, does it not contribute to the creation of the “us” versus “them” thinking so conducive for nationalism?

Sure, NATO enlargement is not without its flaws, but to assign it an antidemocratic effect and the spread of nationalism (in Russia), without taking into consideration the domestic factors that enable the latter to take place is to completely misjudge the North Atlantic Alliance.

And what about the democratic benefits enjoyed by the people of Central and Eastern Europe that were brought on by this same NATO enlargment encirclement so criticised by Messrs. Djerejian, and Stephens?  Are these, too, to be discounted because considerations between major powers must be given preference?

It’s not that Russia’s interests should be ignored, but rather that those of other states should be included in the grand calculus of geopolitics.

p.s. Almost forgot, in the Belgravia post, while McCain gets all the heat, Obama mostly escapes untouched even though both comit the “cardinal sin” of calling for a Membership Action Plan to be given to Georgia.

Finally, isn’t it all just campaign rhetoric?  Neither McCain nor Obama are currently in a position where they will be called upon to act on their promises.  Right now, this is all about getting to the White House; sounding tough is part of the game.  And whoever said that campaigns are won with good “logic?” (Which reminds me that I need to take a look at the Lakoff’s book).

[UPDATE August 15]:  More on this at the WPR blog by Hampton.