The 8th Circle

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Partially out of news fatigue (incessant coverage of the issue became…umm repetitive), I haven’t posted much on the Caucasus war as of late. There have been several major developments that warrant attention.

First, by officially recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia has contradicted its long-held position on the inviolability of territorial borders. It was based on this commitment to sovereignty that Moscow has so stedfastly opposed recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Now, this seems to be out the window (see my comment at Three Kings).

The role of explaining Russia’s actions to the international community was undertaken by President Medvedev. In an op-ed for the Financial Times (Aug. 26) titled Why I had to recognized Georgia’s breakaway regions, Medvedev writes:

A heavy decision weighed on my shoulders. Taking into account the freely expressed views of the Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples, and based on the principles of the United Nations charter and other documents of international law, I signed a decree on the Russian Federation’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Ultimately, this changes nothing. After all Russia’s support for the rebel territories has already made them de facto independent during the past decade. Yet Moscow may have overplayed its hand, because for the first time Russia has abandoned its commitment to sovereignty, a commitment necessary for long-term peace in Europe.

(The next day, the FT published a reply from Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili. In it Saakashvili addresses the propagation of factual inaccuracies during the war, e.g. exact death tool, claims of genocide, etc. and argues that Russia is intent on redrawing the map of Europe by force. Have a read, and judge for yourself: Medvedev here; Saakashvili here).

The world’s reaction

Moscow’s unilateral recognition of the rebel provinces has been met with immense criticism and opposition in the world community, even states that enjoy a particularly close relationship with Russia like Germany were highly critical of Russia’s move, to say nothing of the opposition voiced in London and Washington.

So hoping for better luck and a warmer reception from the East, Russia expected the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional security group, to “provide the strong international backing” for its actions. The reaction, however, was removed and neutral writes the New York Times:

Dmitry A. Medvedev, the Russian president, arrived in…[Dushanbe, Tajikistan]…for the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, with hopes that the six-member group would provide the strong international backing the Kremlin has so far lacked after its incursion into Georgia. Moscow has urged other nations to follow its lead and recognize Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.

Instead, the organization, which also includes China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, took a neutral stance, urging Russia and Georgia to resolve their differences peacefully.

“The S.C.O. states express grave concern in connection with the recent tensions around the South Ossetia issue and urge the sides to solve existing problems peacefully, through dialogue, and to make efforts facilitating reconciliation and talks,” the summit’s final joint declaration said, using the initials of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

This should not be surprising. China’s commitment to sovereignty has always equaled that of Russia if not more so due to Beijing’s own territorial woes in the Xinjiang province and Taiwan [update:  also Tibet, via Doug Merrill at Afoe]. The SCO, where China plays a co-leading role with Russia, simply could not support a precedent with clear potential to destabilize the One China policy status quo.

Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation (Photo by the Presidential Press and Information Office)

The Medvedev doctrine?

Meanwhile, pundits and journalists are wondering if a new Russian doctrine is being crafted in Kremlin. The Washington Post writes:

Mr. Medvedev was asked by more than one journalist whether Russia’s aggression might be directed at other neighboring states, such as Ukraine, Moldova or the Baltic members of NATO. He answered by noting that millions of Russians live outside the country, and he asserted the right as “commander in chief” to “protect the lives and dignity of our citizens.” He stated to the BBC: “In certain cases I have no choice but to take these kinds of actions.”

Those in the West who persist in blaming Georgia or the Bush administration for the present crisis ought to carefully consider those words — and remember the history in Europe of regimes that have made similar claims. This is the rhetoric of an isolated, authoritarian government drunk with the euphoria of a perceived victory and nursing the delusion of a restored empire. It is convinced that the West is too weak and divided to respond with more than words. If nothing is done to restrain it, it will never release Georgia — and it will not stop there.

From an empirical position, the second underlined statement is, broadly speaking, true. States that win wars have a higher probability of fighting another war soon thereafter vs. those states that suffer defeat or get bugged down in their military excursions. But perhaps this won’t apply to the current situation.

For Russia fighting another war with any of its neighbors would do nothing to advance its national interests. Its aspirations for “greatness” and “respect” will not be achieved by flagrant violation of state sovereignty. Recall the neoconservative’s belief that American interests in the 21st century would be best advanced by the use of military might. That worked out really well.

Thus rather than attempting to establish a new doctrine, Russia’s best bet would be to stick to non-military intrusion in other states’ domestic affairs (which it does quite well).

Yet the calculus in Moscow on what to do next may differ, let’s hope in the more moderate direction.

[UPDATE]: Nosemonkey asks What does Russia have to gain?; Also, Leopolis writes a two part commentary on the war in the Caucasus (part i, part ii).